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TRADE-MARK ASSIGNMENTS AND
RESTRAINTS OF TRADE: THE MAOLA
ICE CREAM CASE
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lilt

ASSIGNMENT OF TRADE-MARKS

The Maola Case
The problems involved in determining the extent of assignability
of trade-marks led one observer to remark forty years ago that "in
trade-mark matters the place where the most numerous and the most
costly mistakes are most frequently made is in the matter of transfers."' While much of the confusion and uncertainty in this segment
of trade-mark law has been eliminated through the years by the gradual
convergence of the legal and commercial concepts of trade-mark2 rights
and functions, many questions are yet unsettled. No better evidence
of this fact can be presented than the results of an assignment in the
case of Mao/a Ice Cream Company of North Carolina v. Maola Milk
and Ice Cream Company.3
The factual situation in the Maola case is simple. The plaintiff, an
ice cream manufacturer, sold and distributed his product under the
trade-mark "Maola" from two plants in North Carolina-one in Washington and the other in New Bern. During the time that the two plants
were operated by the plaintiff there was a well defined division of territory between them so that distribution and sales of ice cream from one
plant would not overlap that of the other. In 1935 the New Bern
plant was sold to the defendant and with it was assigned the right to
use the trade-mark "Maola" but only in the territory theretofore served
by the New Bern plant. For a period of eighteen years the territorial
division was observed by both parties except for rare encroachments at
the border line. In March of 1953, however, the defendant purchased
a dairy within the plaintiff's territory and began selling ice cream
products under the trade-mark "Maola" in competition with the plaintiff's "Maola" products.
* Former Editor-in-Chief, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEw.
t Associate Editor, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW.
GOODWILL, TRADE-MARES AND UNFAIR TRADING 108 (1914).
' As used hereafter in this paper the word "trade-marks" shall include both
technical trade-marks and trade names. There appears to be no reason for
drawing a distinction for the purposes of assignability. Cf., however, Note, 28
COL L. R~v. 353 (1928).
3238 N. C. 317, 77 S. E. 2d 910 (1953).
'ROGERS,
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The North Carolina Supreme Court sustained a demurrer ore tenus
to the plaintiff's complaint of unfair competition and vacated a restraining order granted by the trial judge.
The court apparently did not question the validity of the trade-mark
assignment, but it did decide that the restriction on the defendant's
use of the mark "Maola" was invalid and unenforceable for three
reasons: (1) the agreement was a limitation upon the rights of the
defendant to do business anywhere in North. Carolina within the meaning of G. S. § 75-4, which requires such agreements to be in writing and
signed by the restricted party;4 (2) the agreement was a division of
territory for the purpose of shutting off competition by preventing the
defendant from engaging in the ice cream business under the trademark "Maola" outside of the restricted territory;5 (3) the agreement,
even if not viewed as a division of territory, was a contract in partial
restraint of trade greater in scope than was reasonable for the protection of the plaintiff.6
The agreement between plaintiff and defendant split a trade-mark
on a single line of products between two independent firms for continued use by each firm on these same products. By invalidating the
territorial restrictions the court allows the concurrent use of the identical trade-mark in the same market area. In fact the court declared
by way of dictum that if there had been no provision in the contract
regarding territory "it would seem that the defendant had a legal right
to buy a dairy in Williamston and distribute and sell its products there
under the trade-mark 'Maola' in rivalry with the plaintiff without being
'7
guilty of unfair competition."
IN.
C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (1950) : "No contract or agreement hereafter made
limiting the rights of any person to do business anywhere in the State of North
Carolina shall be enforceable unless such agreement is in writing duly signed
by the party not to enter into such business within such territory. . " The applicability of this statute to the facts in the Maola case may be seriously questioned.
For all that appears the defendant is free to enter the ice cream business anywhere in North Carolina under any other trade-mark.
' The court relied on Culp v. Love, 127 N. C. 475, 37 S. E. 476 (1900);
Shute v. Shute, 176 N. C. 462, 97 S. E. 392 (1918); Hill v. Davenport, 195
N. C. 271, 141 S. E. 752 (1928), all of which involve covenants not to compete
made by vendors of businesses and good will.
' Included among the authorities cited for this holding are Comfort Spring
Corp. v. Burrough, 217 N. C. 658, 9 S. E. 2d 473 (1940); Sonotone Corp. v.
Baldwin, 227 N. C. 387, 42 S. E. 2d'352 (1947); and Kadis v. Britt, 224 N. C.
154, 29 S.E. 2d 543 (1944), which are concerned with the validity of employeremployee contracts.
The court mentions the fact that there is nothing in the pleadings in Maola
to show that the plaintiff ever sold ice cream in all of eastern North Carolina,
perhaps implying that if the plaintiff had served the entire territory the transferred mark might have been confinable within the area for which it was assigned. Possibly a future case will reveal that this makes a difference; it is
difficult to see why it should.
'Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice Cream Co., 238 N. C. 317, 321,
77 S.E. 2d 910 (1953).
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Assignability in General
Fettered by the outworn notion that the sole function of a trademark is to indicate to the consuming public the origin and source of
the goods to which it is attached" the courts have been slow in interpreting the law to conform with the functional development of the
trade-mark in the business world. The traditional and orthodox rule
is that trade-marks cannot be transferred in gross; that they can only
be transferred as incidental to a transfer of the business in which they
are used.
If a certain trade-mark does in fact denote the origin or
source of the goods the validity of the accepted rule cannot be doubted.
To assign such a mark to another for use on goods emanating from a
different source would obviously produce confusion and deception in
the minds of the consumers.10 It is only by completely ignoring reality,
however, that anyone can insist that such is the sole purpose of a trademark in the modem economy. That there would be a clash between
the business man's conception of his trade-mark rights and the law's
narrow conception of the same right was inevitable."
Those advocating an overhaul of the rules governing the transfer
of trade-marks have urged that a trade-mark could be a symbol of
many factors combining to produce a state of mind in the public which
2
causes them to buy certain goods, or from certain places or persons.'
8"The primary and proper function of a trade-mark is to identify the origin
or ownership of the article to which it is affixed." Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916); Columbia Mill Co. v. Allcorn, 150 U. S. 460
(1889); MacMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chemical Mfg. Co., 113 Fed. 468
(8th Cir. 1901); 3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, 278 n.
12 (2d ed. 1950); 1 NIms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 86 n. 19 (4th
ed. 1947).
" "A trade-mark cannot be assigned, or its use licensed, except as incidental
to a transfer of the business or property in connection with which it is used.
An assignment or license without such a transfer is totally inconsistent with
the theory upon which the value of a trade-mark depends 'and its appropriation
by an individual is permitted. The essential value of a trade-mark is that it
identifies to the trade the merchandise upon which it appears as of a certain
origin, or as the property of a certain person. . . . Disassociated from merchandise to which it properly appertains, it lacks the- essential characteristics
which alone give it value, and becomes a false and deceptive designation. It is
not by itself such property as may be transferred." MacMahan Pharmacal Co.
v. Denver Chemical Mfg. Co., 113 Fed. 468, 474 (8th Cir. 1901). See also
Crossman v. Griggs, 186 Mass. 275, 71 N. E. 560 (1904) ; Falk v. American
West Indies Trading Co., 180 N. Y. 445, 73 N. E. 239 (1905) ; and cases cited
in 2 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1277 n. 6; 1 NIms, op. cit. supra note 8
at 87 n. 19.
•"See for example: Pepper v. Labrat, 8 Fed. 29 (C. C. D. Ky. 1881) ; Prince's
Metallic Paint Co. v. Prince Mfg. Co., 57 Fed. 938 (3d Cir. 1893); Societe
Vinicole de Champagne v. Mumm Champagne & Importation Co., 13 F. Supp.
575 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); A. I. M. Percolating Corp. v. Ferodine Chemical
Corp., 139 Va. 366, 124 S. E. 442 (1924).
"' Isaacs, Traffic in Trade Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1210 (1931).
"Ibid.; Lane, The Transfer of Trade-marks and Trade Names, 6 ILL. L.
Rw¢. 46 (1911) ; Grismore, The Assignment of Trade-marks and Trade Names,
30 MIcE. L. REv." 489 (1932).
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This state of mind is the concept conveyed by the term "good will."13
The factors which might engender good will are innumerable. In
short, everything that increases the favor of a business with the public
contributes to its good will. While origin or source of a particular
product might well be the factor which creates the good will symbolized
by its trade-mark there are many more instances where that factor
is not significant. In fact it is probably more accurate to say that,
owing to the ramifications of modern trade and the distribution of
goods through jobbers, retailers and other middlemen, rarely does
14
the consumer even know the origin of trade-marked goods.
Why then, asked many writers, should the courts insist on adhering
to such a narrow conception of the purpose of a trade-mark in testing
the validity of transfers? If the consuming public is not even aware
of the manufacturing or commercial origin of goods would any confusion or deception be created if the goods were made by someone else
or at some other place as long as whatever factors the trade-mark did
symbolize to the public remained the same? In other words, a trademark could function as a guaranty to the consumer of the make and
quality of the article he is buying.'6 In determining the validity of a
transfer, they argued, the first thing to determine is what is the function of the trade-mark in that particular case-what factors does it
connote to the buying public? Then if the factors are contrary to this
cQnnotation after the transfer it is likely that the public will be deceived and the transfer should not be allowed; if the factors are the
same there is no reason not to allow the transfer. The sole inquiry
should be: Will the particular transfer cause the public to be deceived
or confused ?16

To what extent this demand for a more rational viewpoint regard"The classic definition of good will is that of Judge Story: "The goodwill
may properly enough be described to be the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment beyond the mere value of the capital stock, funds or
property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and
encouragement which it receives from constant or habitual customers on account
of its local position or common celebrity or reputation for skill or affluence or
punctuality or from other accidental circumstances or necessities or even from
ancient partialities or prejudices."

STORY, PARTNERSmP § 99 (5th ed. 1859).

See also Grismore, supra note 12, at 492; 1 Nlms, op. cit. supra note 8, § 13.
"' Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade-Mark Protection, 40 HARV. L. Rtv.
813, 814 (1927); ROGERs, GOODWILL, TRADE-MARICS AND UNFAIR TRADING 68
(1914). Walter Baker & Co., Ltd. v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514, 518 (7th Cir. 1904):
"We may safely take it for granted that not one in a thousand knowing of or
desiring to purchase 'Baker's Cocoa' or 'Baker's Chocolate' know of Walter
Baker & Co.. Limited."
"Isaacs, Traffic in Trade Symbols, 44 HARv. L. R.. 1210, 1220 (1931) presents an extensive analysis of the guaranty function of a trade-mark. See also:
2 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 8, § 65.2; Schechter, Vupra note 14; Schechter,
Fog and Fiction in Trade-Mark Protection, 36 COL. L. Ray. 60 (1936).
",Of course, a transfer could be otherwise unlawful, i.e. a device to restrain
trade.
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ing transfers influenced the decisions of the courts is difficult to measure since they have continued to pay at least verbal obedience to the
old rules. 1 7

The principle that a trade-mark is a symbol of good will

has been accepted and the courts no longer require that the physical
assets of a business be transferred along with a trade-mark in all cases.
It is enough if the right to engage in the particular business in which
the mark is used is conveyed, if some tangible indicia of the good will
are transferred with it.' 8 The net result would seem to be that actually
the only limitation on the assignability of trade-marks is the likelihood
of deception despite what the courts say, since the requirement that
good will which has been built around the mark must be transferred
is only another way of saying that the significance of the mark in the
mind of the customer must remain the same after the transfer.' 9
PartialTransfers
With this summary of the development of trade-mark transfer, it
is necessary to revert to those cases which deal more specifically with
partial transfers. Earlier interpretations of the law would not allow
a transfer if the transferor continued to manufacture articles identical
with those on which the assigned mark was used, even if the transferor used a different mark. Thus in the case of Independent Baking
Powder v. Boornman? ° a baking powder manufacturer using five trademarks assigned one of them and continued to make and sell baking
powder under the other marks. The court held the assignment to be
ineffective:
"[N]either the good will of a business, nor the business itself,
can be thus split up. I am persuaded that the use of decimal
fractions will not be adopted for the purpose of determining just
how much or how little of the good will of a business, or of the
business itself, must be transferred with a trade-mark, in order
that its assignment should be valid. * * * [T]he assignor cannot,
after the assignment, continue the same identical business and
at the same place as before, under unassigned trade-marks, and
the same busiat the same time authorize his assignee to conduct
21
ness elsewhere under an assigned trade-mark."
Notes, 43 HARv. L. RFv. 636 (1930) ; 24 VA. L. R-v. 440 (1938).
Andrew Jergens Co. v. Woodbury, 273 Fed. 952 (D. C. D. Del. 1921),
cert. denied, 260 U. S. 728 (1922) (list of customers) ; Mcllvaine v. City Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 314 Ili. 496, 42 N. E. 2d 93 (1942) (transfer of customer's
deposits) ; De Wees v. Schnieder, 33 Pa. 401, 5 A. 2d 174 (1939) (transfer of
patent). See also 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 8, § 17.
10 See Grismore, The Assignment of Trade-Marks and Trade Nanes, 30
M rH.
L. Rzv. 489, 498 (1932) where this proposition is convincingly demonstrated by an analysis of cases. See also Note, 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 863 (1940).
"0175 Fed. 448 (C. C. D. N. J.1910).
21
1Id.at 453.
' See
18
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The court in the Baking Powder case relied on the earlier decision
in Eiseman v. Schiffer2 2 where the factual situation was similar except
that the assignor had used only one trade-mark, and after assigning
this together with the good will of the business, continued to manufacture the same product under a new trade-mark. The attempted
assignment was void according to the court, since the special business
in which the mark was used was not transferred but remained with
the assignor.
The development of the law in this particular situation is evidenced
by Section 10 of the Lanham Act, which does not require that the
good will of an entire business be assigned with a mark but permits the
transfer of only so much of the good will as is connected with the use
of the mark.23 Likewise, several states now have similar provisions
on assignment in their trade-mark statutes.23 a Such a provision necessarily implies that a trade-mark indicates more than the origin of goods.
Thus the law will sanction at least one type of partial transfer;
for example, Phillip Morris & Co. could assign its "Marlboro" trademark, together with the part of its good will in the cigarette business
symbolized by that mark, and continue to make and sell "Phillip Morris" cigarettes.
Another type of partial transfer might occur where different goods
22 157 Fed. 473 (S. D. N. Y. 1907). This case involved Section 10 of the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905 which provided: "Every registered trade-mark, and
every mark for registration of which application has been made, together with
the application for registration of the same shall be assignable in connection
with the goodwill of the business in which the mark is used." The Eiseman
case is also generally recognized as authority on the rule as to assignments under
common law. 1 NIMS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 90 n. 13.
2360 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U. S. C. § 1051 (Supp. 1952) : "It shall not be
necessary to include the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and
symbolized by any other mark used in the business or by the name or style under
which the business ig conducted; Provided, That any assigned registration may
be cancelled at any time if the registered mark is being used by, or with the
permission of, the assignee so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or
services in connection with which the mark is used." For a general discussion
of assignments under the 1946 act see Halliday, Assignments Under the Lanham
Act, 38 T. M. REP. 970 (1948).
2 a Several states have trade-mark statutes whose assignment provisions are
identical with or similar to a good part of Sec. 10 of the Lanham Act: ARK.
STAT. § 70-531 (Supp. 1953); CAL Civ. CODE § 14273 (Deering 1951); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 141-1-5 (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 81-116 (Supp. 1953); LA.
REv. STAT. § 51-217 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 41, § 87F (Supp.
1954); Miss CODE ANN. § 4227---06 (Supp. 1952); N. H. REV. LAWS c. 207-A,
§6 (1949) ; N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 365; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 18 (1951);
S. C. STAT. AT LARGE No. 722, Sec. 6 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 6765.2 (Supp.
1952). Other state statutes providing, in more or less detail, for assignment are:
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6790 (1949); INn. ANN. STAT. § 66-110 (Burns 1951);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.5 (1950) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 365.120 (1953) ; ME. REV.
STAT. c. 168. § 8 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 110, . 8 (1954) ; MIcH. STAT.
ANN. § 18.636 (1937); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 85-202 (1947); NEV. Rv.
STr. § 87-102 (1943); N. J. STAT. ANN. 56: 3-4 (1940); R. I. GEN. LAWs
c. 394, § 7 (1938); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-1-6 (1953).
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of the same class are sold under one trade-mark and the right to use
the mark on particular goods within that class is assigned to another.
Such transfers seem to have met the approval of the courts. 24 The
most notable example involved the trade-mark "Prang," which had
become well known on school and art supplies. An assignment of that
mark in connection with the sale of parts of the business involving
certain school supplies was sustained even though the assignor retained
the use of "Prang" on many other closely related goods. 25 Reconciling
the results in this type of transfer with the notion that a trade-mark
functions only as an indication of source is impossible; it is only by
accepting the guaranty function of a trade-mark that the decision is
26

intelligible.

26
A quite similar case was Chester H. Roth, Ic. v. Esquire Inc. a
The plaintiff, a hosiery manufacturer, used the trade-mark "Esquire"
on its socks; the defendant publishing house used the same mark on its
magazine. Both marks were registered. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held valid a contract between the two binding them,
among other things, not to infringe upon one another's business by
use of the mark, and to pool their efforts in its defense against thirdparty usurpers.
The next logical step leads directly to the problem in the Maola
case, i.e., whether a trade-mark used on one product can be split by
assig r ent between two independent owners to be used by each on the
same type goods. Two very important distinctions which must be
recognized are emphasized by the italicized words:
First, it is quite possible that two persons might independently
adopt the same mark upon goods of the same class in separate and remote market areas. 27 In such a case concurrent use of the same mark

- American Crayon Co. v. Prang Co., 38 F. 2d 448 (3d Cir. 1930) ; Shephard

v. Shephard, 145 Neb. 12, 15 N. W. 2d 195 (1944); Jergens Co. v. Woodbury,
Inc., 197 N. Y. 66, 90 N. E. 344 (1909).
"American Crayon Co. v. Prang Co., 38 F. 2d 448 (3d Cir. 1930) ; Note, 24
ILL. L. Rxv. 591 (1930).
"See, however, Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade-mark Protection, 40

HARv. L. REv. 813, 816 (1927): "Discarding then the idea that a trade-mark
or trade name informs the consumer as to the actual source or origin of goods,

what does it indicate and with what result? It indicates, not that the article in
question comes from a definite or particular source, the characteristics of which
or the personalities connected with which are specifically known to the consumer
but merely that the goods in connection with which it is used emanate from the
same-possibly anonymous-source or have reached the consumer through the
same channels as certain other goods that have already given the consumer
satisfaction and that bore the same trade-mark." See also 1 NIms, op. cit.
mtpra note 8, at 94, who has this to say about the Prang situation: "The plight
of the unfortunate consumer who is deceived as a result of such split-ups of business concerns apparently was ignored by all hands, the courts included."
'ea 186 F. 2d 11 (6th Cir. 1951).
27 The two landmark cases: United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S.90
(1918) and Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916). Con-
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would be perfectly valid. It is obvious, however, that this situation is different from one where the concurrent use is created by a partial transfer
of a trade-mark by the person who originally acquired it.
Second, the right to use a trade-mark may be granted to another
by some form of controlled license. The licensor-owner grants to the
licensee permission to use the trade-mark for a specific purpose and
the right to the mark remains in the licensor.2s An excellent example
of this type of trade-mark transfer is demonstrated by the Coca-Cola
cases" where the licensor is the manufacturer of the basic syrup which
is furnished to the licensee-bottling companies to be combined with carbonated water and sold as a finished drink. Although the bottlers use
the trade-mark "Coca-Cola" the quality of the product is under complete control of the licensor, since it manufactures the chief ingredient
and exercises rigid supervision over the bottling process. On the
other hand, in the normal assignment the assignee receives full rights
to the mark and there is no element of control between assignor and
assignee.
Partial assignments covering the business in an entire country have
been sanctioned by the courts. Thus in A. Bourgois and Co. v.Katzel30
a French concern doing business in that country and in the United
States was held to have effectively transferred its trade-mark rights in
this country by a sale of its United States business and good will. The
assignee, however, continued to purchase the goods on which he affixed the mark from the French concern. It is apparent that under
any view of the function of a trade-mark there would be no reason not
to uphold this assignment; the assignee was in effect no more than a
selling agent for the assignor's goods. 3 '
current registration of trade-marks in situations where two persons have adopted
the same mark is provided for by § 2(d) of the Lanham Act if "confusion or
mistake or deceit of purchasers is not likely to result." See generally Halliday,
Concurrent Registrations Under the New Trade-mark Law, 37 T. M. REP. 243

(1947).

28Extensive discussions of controlled licensing at common law and under
the "related company" provisions of the Lanham Act may be found in Taggart, Trade-narks and Related Companies: A New Concept in Statutory Trademark Law, 14 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 234 (1949) and Schniderman, Trademark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy and Fact, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROu. 248
(1949).
"2Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916); The Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920); Coca-Cola v.
J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 Fed. 224 (E. D. Ark. 1916).
30260 U. S. 689 (1933). A similar case is Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger,
5 F. 2d 506 (S. D. N. Y. 1925).
"2This selling agent feature was not present, however in Mulhens & Kropp v.
Ferd Muelhens, 43 F. 2d 937 (2d Cir. 1930), which also involved a country-wide
transfer of a trade-mark. A German manufacturer had developed a cologne by
a secret formula which along with other related products had become well known
throughout the 'world under the trade-mark "4711." The purchaser of the
business, good will and trade-marks for the United States was not allowed to
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Therefore, it would appear that the territorial transfer of a trademark for use in the entire United States will be upheld if it meets
the normal requirements of transfers-if the use of the mark by the
transferee does not result in confusion or deception of the consumers.
In fact, so far as the consumers in this country are concerned the
situation is little different from an assignment of all rights in a trademark. Although the foreign transferor will continue to use the mark
in other countries, there is very little likelihood that there will be any
confusion between the goods of the two independent users of the mark
since the market areas are remote and separate.
More serious consideration must be given to partial transfers
limited to particular states or districts within the United States, and,
especially, to those limited to particular territories within one state.
Unfortunately there appears to be a dearth of decisions which have
dealt with this problem.8 2 A Missouri court in 1882 indicated that
such transfers would be invalid and in fraud of the public. - Dictum in
a Utah decision 34 to the opposite effect is very questionable since the
court in support of its statement relied on a "controlled license" case.3 5
Other cases have closely approached the question but have produced no clear-cut decision on the problem of assignments.3 6 Only
Griggs, Cooper & Co. v. Erie Preservikg Co. 37 deserves extended consideration. The plaintiff had started using the trade-mark "HomeBrand" on his canned fruit and jellies but discovered that another concern had previously adopted the same mark on the same type merchandise. The prior acquirer then assigned to the plaintiff the right to
use the name "Home-Brand." The assignment further provided that
neither party was to imitate in design or color the label of the other.
The court upheld the transfer, stating that "the assignor parted with
the exclusive ownership and good will in its arbitrarily selected trademark 'Home-Brand' within the territory specified in the assignment,
use the mark on cologne since he had not acquired the secret recipe, but he did
become entitled to exclusive use of the mark in this country on those items on
which the mark did not denote manufacture by the formula.

"2It is probable that many such territorial transfers have occurred and are

upheld by gentlemen's agreements that do not rely on the law.
Traffic in Trade Symbols, 44 HAv. L. REv. 1210 (1931).

"Snodgrass v. Welle, 11 Mo. App. 590 (1882).

See Isaacs,

The decision of this case

was not reported but the memorandum reads: "Territorial rights in a trade-

mark cannot be sold to different persons so as to enable each to make and sell
their goods as those made by the original owner of the mark in fraud of the
public."
"'Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & Jordan Mill & Elevator Co., 58 Utah
149, 197 Pac. 731 (1921).
"The court cited The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 269

Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920). See note 29 supra.
"See for example Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 204 Minn. 300, 283 N. W.
561 (1938) ; A. B. C. Stores v. Rickey, 280 S. W. 177 (Tex. App. 1920).
.7 131 Fed. 359 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1904).
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merely reserving to itself . .. certain permissive rights to its personal
use." 8 Although not mentioned in the opinion, apparently the court
felt that the difference in labels would eliminate the possibility of confusion, which fact would distinguish the Maola situation where the
labels were practically identical. The result, however, is that two
competing companies had the right to use "Home-Brand" on the same
products in the same area.
The Legal Effect of the Maola Case
By no means have all the possible sources of authority been exhausted, but perhaps it is now possible to reach some conclusion regarding the Maola dilemma. For all that appears the trade-mark
"Maola" functions as a guarantee to the consumers of the quality of
the ice cream products which it identifies. It would seem, therefore,
if the ice cream of both plaintiff and defendant was of the same quality,
that there would be no reason why each owner should not be able to use
the mark in its territory. There is no evidence, however, that the
defendant made its product according to the same standards or formulae as the plaintiff, or that the defendant's ice cream was of equal
quality with that of the plaintiff. Had the plaintiff when it assigned
the mark stipulated that the defendant might use it only on products
made by a certain formula or meeting a certain standard perhaps concurrent use of the same mark in the two territories might not be
against public policy. But even so, difficult questions arise if there
is no relation or element of control between the two users. Who
would make certain that the defendant did not alter his product?
Suppose the plaintiff materially altered the formula by which he manufactured his own product? The irresistible conclusion is that such a
territorial assignment as occurred in the Maola case should be held
invalid because of its confusing and deceptive possibilities to the public.
A "controlled license" agreement would not only have protected the
value of the trade-mark to the plaintiff but the interests of the public
as well.
The court's dictum that if no territorial restrictions had been included in the assignment the two parties could have used the mark in
the same market area is even more unsound if the above conclusions
are valid. Unless the products of the two companies were identical
in every respect confusion and deception of the public would be inevitable.
From the foregoing, it appears that there is not very much support
for the view of the court that the transfer of the trade-mark in the
8
1Id. at 362. See the comments on this case in 3 CALLMAN, Op. Cit. siepra note
8, at 1284.
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circumstances of the Maola case is valid. And, moreover, the possibility that by the transfer the plaintiff may have abandoned his rights to
39
the mark should not have been overlooked.

II.

THE PROBLEM OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE

Maola's Treatment of the Problem
Assuming that a trade-mark can be "split" territorially or otherwise, a further intriguing and as yet unsettled issue raised by the
Maola caseO is the question of whether the resulting symbolic schizophrenia may constitute or contribute to an unlawful restraint of trade.
The court thought that there was such a restraint in Maola. In reaching that conclusion, it relied upon Shute v. Shute,4 1 a case that held
unenforceable a covenant by the vendee of a cotton gin not to engage
in ginning and certain related businesses north of a certain line in
a North Carolina County. But Shute is almost entirely unrelated to
Maola, for the vendee in the latter case was always perfectly free to
sell ice cream anywhere he pleased under any other trade mark except
"Maola." It is difficult to understand in what manner competition
would be diminished by having "Maola" ice cream marketed in eastern
North Carolina by two companies in different areas, rather than by
one company supplying both areas.
The trade restraint aspect of the case raises a number of questions.
Would the agreement not to sell outside the territory previously supplied by the transferred plant have been enforceable had the transferor been doing business everywhere else in eastern North Carolina
from the plant he retained? In the future, will the transferor's successors be able to sell with impunity under the mark "Maola" in territory heretofore served by the transferred plant?
Whatever the answers to these questions, the most perplexing part
of the decision is the court's assumption that competition will be stimulated by a result that allows offering to the same public two entirely
distinct "Maola" ice creams. Competition is dependent, to a large
extent, upon the ability of the public to distinguish the products of
different manufacturers ;42 the Maola decision, therefore, is likely to
" An attempt to transfer a trade-mark dissociated from the good will usually
destroys the rights in it for it is presumed to have been abandoned. This would
seem to be applicable, however, only in those cases where the transferor after
the ineffective transfer ceases to use the mark himself; in a partial transfer the
transferor intends to continue his own use of the mark. For a general discussion see 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 8, § 408; 2 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note

8, § 78.3 (a); Note, Trade Mark Protection Follozng "Ineffective" Assignment, 88 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 863 (1940).

10238 N. C. 317, 77 S. E. 2d 910 (1953).
"176 N. C. 462, 97 S. E. 392 (1918).

"4 Toulmin, ANTI-TRUST LAws OF THE UNITED STATES § 27.1 (1950) ; Baker,
The Monopoly Concept of Trade-Marks and Trade-Names and "Free-Ride"
Theory of Unfair Competition, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 112 (1948) ; Pattishall,
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give far more impetus to confusion than to competition. The rule
therein enunciated-that a mark cannot be confined within the territory to which it has been assigned-will doubtless discourage any
future territorial assignment in North Carolina.
Maola seems to be unique, among common-law decisions, in imparting the stigma of trade restraint to a mere partial or territorial assignment. As we noted earlier, there are cases upholding various sorts of
partial and territorial assignment without even mentioning trade restraint. At any rate, North Carolina seems to be the only jurisdiction
where territorial assignment and nothing more, amounts to restraint
of trade.
The Federal Cases
Once we pass from the realm of state court decisions involving
assignment and the use of marks in restraint of trade, the issues became
more complex. It is probably not rash to predict that an appreciable
amount of future litigation will see partial and territorial assignment
of trade-marks and, indeed, the use of trade-marks in general examined
in the penetrating light of federal antitrust law. Such an expectation
seems reasonable in view of (1) expanding international trade, increasing the problem of concurrent use of marks, (2) the ever greater
significance given to marks by modern advertising, and (3) the growing tendency to fix resale prices. 43 Two significant federal cases have
recently touched on assignment and related problems, and, while
neither is concerned with trade-marks alone, each constitutes an important milepost in trade-mark law.
In Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States44 American
Timken was adjudged guilty under Section 1 of the Sherman Act4"
for restraining, by agreement with its associates British and French
Timken, international trade in tapered roller bearings. While it is
impossible to say with any precision who owned the mark "Timken"
when the restrictive agreements went into effect, the net result of
various assignments was the three-fold division of the mark for use
in three sharply defined areas of the world. This arrangement, reinforced by agreements not to compete, had effectively eliminated competition among the three companies. American Timken defended the
Trade-Marks and the Momwpoly Phobia, 50 MicH. L.

REV. 967 (1952) ; Taggart,
Trade-Marks: Monopoly or Competition? 43 McH. L. RFv. 659 (1945).
"Stedman, Patent and Trade-Mark Relief in Antitrust Judgments, 10 FED.
B. J.260 (1949).
"341 U. S. 593 (1951).
"'Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . ." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended
50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1952).
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suit on the ground that the restraints involved were reasonable and
ancillary to the trade-mark contracts. This contention the majority
of the Supreme Court of the United States rejected in summary fashion.
"Nor can the restraints of trade," wrote Justice Black, "be justified as
reasonable steps taken to implement a valid trade-mark licensing system. . . .
The case is rather novel in holding that the Sherman Act
requires competition among affiliates, 47 but a fortiori it requires it
among non-affiliates and it may, of course, in the future be applied
where non-affiliates have split a mark to restrain trade. The greatest
impact of the case may in the long run be on domestic commerce, since
well recognized principles of international law place certain limits upon
the 6apacity of the courts of the United States to deal effectively with
restraints of trade that reach beyond the nation's borders. 48 In any
event, statistics set forth in the trial court's Tintken opinion show the
potency of territorial manipulation of trade-marks as a device to mini49
mize competition.
The other case, United States v. General Electric Co., 5° involved
the licensing of a trade-mark-in this instance the famous "Mazda"
used on incandescent lamps-by General Electric to Westinghouse.
The government's contention was that this arrangement, by flooding
the market with "Mazda" lamps produced by both of the nation's largest electric companies, was designed to induce in the public mind the
impression that only "Mazda" was the "standard" incandescent lamp; it
was further contended that this arrangement had been so successful that
"Mazda" had become a generic term for such lamps, so that it no
longer deserved protection as a trade-mark. This latter argument
the court rejected, but it did find the defendants guilty, because of
their joint exploitation of the trade-mark, of violating Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act. 51 To assess the role played by trade-marks in
the violation, it is not necessary to look beyond the final judgment in
"0341 U. S.593, 598 (1951).
"4

" See Note, The Sherman Act and Multi-CorporateSingle-Traders: Competi-

tion Among Affllates?, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1006 (1952).
"s
This topic is well covered by Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. 639 (1954) ; and Whitney,
Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE
L. J. 655 (1954). In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U, S.280 (1952), however, the Supreme Court of the United States projected this country's judicial
power into Mexico to enjoin infringement there by an American citizen of a
mark owned by the Bulova Co.
"'United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. "Supp. 284, 288-289
(N.D. Ohio 1949).
;582 F. Supp. 753 (D. N. J. 1949).
" 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2
(1952). Section 1 is set forth in note 45, supra. Section 2 reads: "Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with

any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor. . .
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the case, which placed extremely severe restrictions upon General Electric's use of its trade-mark. "Mazda" was restricted to use in con52
nection with not more than one per cent of yearly sales.
General Electric and Timken are only portions of a rather extensive
literature. 53 Both illustrate the effective restraint of trade obtainable
by the imaginative use of trade-mark assignment or licensing. Timken
is an example of the "double" guarantee of restraint effectuated where
both territory and trade-marks are divided: in addition to the often
unenforceable agreement not to compete, the parties to such an arrangement can utilize the subtler sanction of injunction against infringement
of the trade-mark, whenever one yields to the temptation to sell in
territory allotted to another. 54 But it is hardly likely that these and
similar practices will escape the full impact of the federal antitrust laws,
for as Judge Freed, who wrote the trial court opinion in the Timken
case, has noted: "If a trade mark may be the legal basis for allocating
world markets, fixing of prices, restricting competition, the unfailing
device has been found to destroy every vestige of inhibition set up by
the Sherman Act."' 55
The Lanharn Act

Violation of federal antitrust law by the use of a mark may have
certain special consequences to the owner where the mark is registered
under the Lanham Act of 1946.50 "Whatever extension of trade mark
rights is encompassed in the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, .

. . its enact" "Section VI, Competitive Bidding and Trademarks:
B. General Electric is enjoined and restrained from making any use of the
United States trade-mark 'Mazda' in connection with more than 1% of its
sales of lamps in any calendar year.
C. General Electric is enjoined and restrained for a period of three years from
the date of the Judgment from:
(1) Directly or indirectly authorizing any other person in the United States
to use in any manner, in connection with lamps not manufactured by or for
General Electric, any United States trade-mark owned or controlled and used
by General Electric in the United States in connection with lamps, except
with respect to lamps sold by such person to General Electric.
(2) Using, in any manner, in connection with lamps manufactured by or
for General Electric and sold in the United States, any United States trademark known by it to be owned or controlled and used by any person in connection with lamps manufactured by or for such other person and sold in
the United States,, except where such sale is made by General Electric to
such trademark owner."
Final Judgment, United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp 835, 858
(D. N. J. 1953).
"See, for example, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Patents, United States Senate, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 82, Nov. 15 and
16, 1944, pp. 58-71, Report of the Department of Justice. Other examples are
noted in Diggins, Trade-Marks and Restraint of Trade, 32 GEo. L. J. 113 (1944).
" See Stedman, Elimination of Trade Barriers Based Upon Trade-Marks, 10
FED. B. J. 162 (1949).
" United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 316 (N. D.
Ohio 1949).
"'60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1051-1127 (1952).
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ment did not open the door to employ a trade mark as an instrument
to undermine the antitrust laws. This is borne out with transparent
'57
These words, having been spoken
clarity by its legislative history."
by a federal judge, may be taken at face value. Yet it is impossible
at the present time to be very specific about this facet of the Lanham
Act without indulging in speculation. The section involved is 33 (b)
(7):
"If the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable
under section 15 hereof, the certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered
mark in commerce or in connection with the goods or services
specified in the certificate subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein except when one of the following defenses
or defects is established:
(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the
58
antitrust laws of the United States."
Well-known authorities in the field of trade regulation are unable
59
Do they relate simply
to agree upon the meaning of these words.
disposition of litigaultimate
the
to
also
or
incontestability,
to losing
up a complete deset
could
infringer
an
that
mean
tion-which would
the mark was in
of
use
owner's
registered
the
that
fense by proving
the author of
Lanham,
violation of the antitrust laws? Congressman
Representatives,
of
House
the
of
part
the Act, and the managers on the
who sponsored it, were of the opinion that the sole consequence of
33 (b) (7) to a trade-restraining registrant was to "dilute the weight
the court is to give to his certificate of registration as evidence of owner6
A federal case dealing with
ship and the right to use the mark."
,Freed, District Judge, in United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83
F. Supp. 284, 315 n. 2 (1949). U. S. C. § 1115 (1952). In the Code, "section 1065
as60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15
title" is substituted for "section 15 hereof."
this
of
5'Handler, Trade-Marks and Anti-Trust Laws, 38 T. M. REP. 387 (1948)
thinks these words relate to the ultimate disposition of litigation; 4 Tou.MiNm,
ANTi-TRUST LAws OF THE UNITED STATES § 27.33 (1950), agrees with Handler.
4 CALLMANN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs § 97.3 (c) (4)
(2d ed. 1950), seems uncertain. But in volume 1, § 15.5, Callmann states flatly
that Section 33 (b) (7) of the Lanham Act applies to trade-marks the "unclean
hands" theory of the patent cases, making violation of the antitrust laws by a
registrant a complete defense in an action for infringement.
"°Lanham, 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946). The statement of the managers on
the part of the House is particularly illuminating: "This amendment provides
that the use of a registered mark in violation of the antitrust laws shall constitute a defense to a suit by the registrant. The House recedes with an amendment substituting the Words 'to violate' for the words 'in violation of.' This
the
amendment provides an additional defense to the conclusive evidence rule of seccertificate of registration of a mark which has become incontestable under
tion 15. It does not and is not intended to enlarge, restrict, amend or modify
the substantive law of trade-marks either as set out in other sections of this Act
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the problem seems to contain only dictum on this point, and is probably
not an authoritative interpretation of the Act. 1
It would appear that the correct interpretation of this section of
the Lanham Act is that ascribed to it by Congressman Lanham who
said in substance that a registrant using a mark to violate the antitrust
laws loses the incontestability the Act ordinarily gives him after five
years' use of the registered mark, and is also deprived of the benefit
of "the corollary thereto that the certificate of registration is conclusive
evidence of ownership and the right to exclusive use of the mark.10 2
The certificate of registration then becomes only prima facie evidence
of the registrant's right to exclusive use of the mark. Whether a court
might, nevertheless, completely deny relief against infringement by
applying in its decision a principle analogous to the "unclean hands"
maxim of equity, as happened in Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger
Co., 63 is a separate problem which we shall consider later.
Section 33 (b) (7) poses still another complex problem of interpretation: what sort of conduct must be indulged in with a mark before
a court will say that it has been used or is being used "to violate the
antitrust laws of the United States"? Probably, the mark itself must
have been an active, causative instrumentality in violating those laws;
the naked fact that a violator of the laws also happened to use trademarks on his products will in all likelihood not strip those marks of
the benefits accorded them by the Lanham Act. This was the interpretation advanced by the managers on the part of the House of Representatives before the Act was passed-in fact, the bill was amended
by substituting the words "to violate" for "in violation of."'
Still,
33 (b) (7) is not a paragon of statutory clarity on this particular
point, and the recommendation has been made that Subsection 7 be
or as heretofore applied by the Courts. The amendment does not and is not
intended to affect the validity of a mark nor affect the right of the registrant
to continue use or enforce his rights in the mark. If it is established that a
registrant, has used or is using his registered mark, which has become incontestable, as the legal, causal and efficient instrumentality to violate the antitrust laws of the United States, such registrant is denied the benefit of the rule
that the certificate of registration is conclusive evidence of his exclusive right
to use the mark. Under such circumstances, the certificate is only prima facie
evidence of his exclusive right to use and he must be prepared to carry the
additional burden of proof as though his mark had not become incontestable."

92

CoNG.
6

REc. 7523 (1946).

Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F. R. D. 367 (S. D.
N. Y.
1950).
2
Lanham, in 92 CONG. REC. 7524 (1946). An amendment has been propoged
which would write this interpretation into the Act: Sen. 2540, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1953) introduced by Senator Wiley, July 31, 1953. This is a revision of
Sen. 1957, 82d Cong., 2d Session (1952), also sponsored by Senator Wiley, but
on which no hearings were held.
e3314 U. S.488 (1942).

"92

CoNG.

REc. 7523 (1946).
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amended so as to read "that the mark is being used as an instrument to
violate the antitrust laws of the United States. '65
Even with the section as it stands, the courts should be able to apply
tort law principles of causation and limit its application to cases where
a trade-mark is used as a "legal, causal and efficient instrumentality"66
in the violation of the antitrust laws. Professor Milton Handler, after
speculating on the use of 33 (b) (7) in infringement suits, is not disturbed at its potentialities:
"Unscrupulous defendants will doubtless try to. drag red herrings across the trail, but if the courts apply the section as written and as intended to be administered to the limited case where
the mark itself is a vehicle of antitrust violation, short shrift will
'67
be made of most bogus violations.
This prophecy should put most trade-mark owners at ease, but it
should be remembered that, even under this view of the law, territorial
assignments in restraint of trade are almost always likely to involve
such an active illegal use of marks as to bring home to their owners
the full impact of the antitrust clause of the Lanham Act.
If a mark, through territorial assignment or otherwise, has been
used to violate the antitrust laws, will that fact permanently deprive
it of all protection at the hands of the courts? Unless the violation
is going on at the time when an infringement suit is brought to protect
the mark, or has been terminated under circumstances suspicious
enough to make a court sense false repentence for the sole purpose of
bringing a guileless mark to trial, the court will probably not apply
33 (b) (7) at the defendant's request.68 Such has been the rule where
the defense of misrepresentation by the plaintiff has been interposed ;69
the same philosophy governs in the fields of patent ° and copyright
law.7 1 Even under the Lanham Act; then, it is unlikely that infringement suits will become proceedings wherein the court is cast in the
awe-inspiring role of "an avenger of wrongs committed at large by
72
those who resort to it for relief."
:'Carter,
Defects
Trade-Mark
REP. 110
(1949).REc.
'Expression
usedinbythe
the1946
managers
on the Act,
part 39
of T.
the M.
House.,
92 CONG.
7523 (1946).
:7 Handler, Trade-Marks and Anti-Trust Laws, 38 T. M. REP. 387, 396 (1948).
084 CALLMANN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TR.A-MARKS § 97.3 (c)
(4) (2d ed. 1950).
'Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Worcester Salt Co., 221 Fed. 66 (2d Cir.
1915) ; 4 CALLMANN, Op. cit. supra note 68, § 87.1 (b) (2) ; 2 Niss, LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPFtITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 393 (1947).
"'Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States. 323 U. S. 386 (1945) ; Westinghouse
Elec.
Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Products Co., 179 F. 2d 139 (4th Cir. 1950).
7
' Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
80 F. Supp. 900 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
"' Shauck, J., in Kinner v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co., 69
Ohio St. 339, 69 N. E. 614 (1903).
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"Clean Hands"
Completely aside from the Lanham Act, territorial assignment in
restraint of trade may have other important effects on the ability of the
parties to the assignment to protect the mark against infringers.
Shortly after the enactment of the Sherman Act, infringers began to
interpose the defense that the mark they were accused of usurping was
being used to violate that Act. At first they did so to no avail, since
federal courts proved unwilling to try such a collateral issue in the
course of an infringement suit.73 But a recent United States Supreme
Court case, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.7 4 denying relief
against infringement to a patentee who was using his patent to restrain trade in non-patented goods, may have sounded the death-knell
of this particular line of federal trade-mark decisions. Whether the
principles enunciated in Morton and the line of cases it inaugurated"5
will be applied to trade-mark litigation is one of the crucial enigmas
of contemporary trade-mark law. Because injunction is the standard
and most effective remedy in infringement cases, trade-mark owners
who use their marks in restraint of trade are at the mercy of the "clean
hands" maxim of equity. They might fare no better at law, since there
is language in Morton which indicates that the Supreme Court would
apply the same general principle in the traditionally amoral atmosphere
of the law court."0 Certain it is that the Court, by expanding the not" Searchlight Gas Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co., 215 Fed. 692 (7th Cir. 1914).
This was true whether the violation was unconnected with the trade-mark being
litigated, 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Dickinson, 245' Fed. 609 (6th Cir. 1917); CocaCola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 Fed. 720 (6th Cir. 1912); Coca-Cola Co. v. Deacon
Brown Bottling Co., 200 Fed. 105 (N. D. Ala. 1912); Weyman-Bruton Co. v.
Old Indian Snuff Mills, 197 Fed. 1015 (S.D. N. Y. 1912); or rather intimately
connected with it, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Allen Bros. Tobacco Co., 151
Fed. 819 (2d Cir. 1907); Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Cohen, 37 F. 2d 393 (D. Md.
1930); even so intimately connected that the infringement suit seemed to have
been brought to protect the plaintiff's monopolization of sales. Coca-Cola Co.
v. Bennett, 225 Fed. 429 (D. Kans. 1915), re7'd, Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238
Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916). Generally, federal courts operated under a similar
philosophy in the related field of copyright law. Buck v. Newsreel, Inc., 25 F.
Supp. 787 (D. Mass. 1938); Vitagraph, Inc. v. Grobaski, 46 F. 2d 813 (W. D.
Mich. 1931); M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470
(E.D. S. C. 1924).
71314 U. S. 488 (1942).
" See Mercoid Corp. v.Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S.661 (1944),
denying infringement protection to patents being used in a cross-licensing system
which restrained trade; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S.
173 (1942), holding a licensee not estopped to challenge the validity of a patent
being used by the patentee to fix resale prices; Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago
Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U. S. 394 (1947), reaching the same result where the
licensee had contracted not to challenge the patent; United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U. S. 131 (1948), where the court held .that the copyright privilege was subservient to the public policy expressed in the antitrust laws.
S"It is a principle of general application that courts, and especially courts
of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid where the jlaintiff is using the
right asserted contrary to the public interest." Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppigei
Co., 314 U. S. 488, 492 (1942).
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so-ancient maxim beyond its ordinary confines (cases where some
wrong has occurred between plaintiff and defendant) to the comprehension of the plaintiff's wrong to the public at large, has cut away
a substantial part of its previously enunciated doctrine that "equity
78
does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives."
Those familiar with the general complexity of federal antitrust law
may wonder what effect the injection of complicated antitrust issues
would have in the course of a relatively simple action for trade-mark
infringement. In the patent cases, determination of the antitrust issue
has, surprisingly enough, not been as difficult for court and counsel as
might have been expected; in some instances the Supreme Court has
not even reached a decision as to whether the plaintiff violated a particular statute but has based its denial of relief on the ground that he
has contravened the general public policy, favoring free competition,
which the antitrust statutes symbolize. 79 Since the common law, even
when not reinforced bj statute, favors competition, it is conceivable
that state courts may in the future reason along similar lines, if trademark splitting at the intrastate level proves to be the subject of serious
abuse. In federal courts, even where the specific violation of the Sherman Act is considered, issues ought not to be unreasonably complex,
for the foreclosing of competitors from a substantial market is a per
se violation of the Act, 80 and will be present in most instances of restrictive use of trade-marks.
But all this prognostication is based on the assumption that the
new "clean hands" jurisprudence will in fact be extended to trademark cases. Is this a reasonable assumption? One can reason that
if the patent privilege, sanctified by the Constitution,8 1 has been of
late abridged where restraints of trade were involved, the trade-mark
cannot hope to escape rough treatment in similar circumstances. On
the other hand, the patent cases may be only the judicial manner of
saying "unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required," so that the trade-mark will continue to enjoy a relatively
cordial reception in infringement proceedings. This much is certain:
the trial of issues beyond those existing between the parties is dangerous practice in any suit, alien to our manner of legal thinking, and to be
'7"The

clean hands maxim is exactly as old as the United States Constitu-

CHAFEE, SOME PROBLE;MS OF EQUITY, p. 5 (1950).
" Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S.216, 229 (1934).

tion."8

" Mercoid

Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944);

Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488 (1942).
'0International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947); Fashion
Originator's Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457

(1941).
81 U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8.
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indulged with caution.8 2 A guilty defendant ought not to go from the
courtroom without being enjoined simply because he has been able
to produce an unfavorable character sketch of the plaintiff. Yet, if
trade-mark abuses become pronounced, those who own marks may find
that the law has assumed the outlines prophetically drawn in a federal
district court, in 1941:
"It is well established that the violation of the Sherman
Act . . . cannot be set up as a defense in a suit for infringe-

ment of copyright, trade-mark, or otherwise collaterally in a
suit. * * * But, if the illegal combination is a part of the actual
transaction about which the plaintiff seeks equitable relief, and
to grant such relief would amount to invoking the aid of the
court in furthering such illegal combination, then, under the
doctrine of 'unclean hands' the plaintiff might be deprived of its
right to equitable relief." s
The Future
All this seems a long way from the Maola case, which may appear
entirely unrelated to international market-splitting, the Lanham Act,
and the Sherman Act. The future will probably prove that the relation is indeed slight. The danger that marks on simple products will
be split within a state to restrain trade is small, but the chances are
that territorial assignment of marks used on items distributed nationally
and internationally will give rise to still more litigation. The reports
of federal courts' decisions will be the source to watch for important
developments in an issue that was first raised within their pages and
probably was echoed only coincidentally and inadvertently in the
Maola decision.
To predict how federal law will develop is not easy. The use of
trade-marks to restrain trade is only in its infancy, and the attitude
of the courts toward that use is in a formative stage. Trade-marks
may yet appear to be far more efficient mechanisms for restraining
competition than the courts, heretofore preoccupied with their basic
theory of marks as an identification of source and therefore the she
qua non of free competition, have thus far perceived. There are signs
that this new perception may effect a radical evolution in a vital aspect
of trade-mark law, signs which the attorney handling trade-mark work
must interpret intelligently, lest he act at his clients' peril.
8 Chafee, in the first three chapters of SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY

(1950),

points out the threat to justice that often arises from a careless application of
the ""clean
hands" maxim.
Folmer Graflex Corp. v. Graphic Photo Service, 41 F. Supp. 319, 320 (1941).
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CONCLUSIONS

If partial transfer of a trade-mark is permissible, as the North
Carolina Supreme Court has assumed, then it should follow that the
resulting division of territories should be upheld in order to prevent
the public from being greeted with identical names and trade-marks
in the same territory on the same product. There is little danger that
this division will have adverse effects on freedom of competition; it is
not like a covenant not to compete because here the parties can compete
all they please so long as they use different marks. Indeed, the normal
situation is that parties who really compete should and must use different names.

